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ABSTRACT
Social information can profoundly influence behavior, perceptual and evaluative 
judgments, and even physiological response to pain. Yet, few studies have looked at its 
influence on emotion experience, a construct that is inherently social. Here, we describe 
a study that investigated the effect of others’ emotion ratings on self-reported and 
physiological indices of emotion in response to pleasant and unpleasant pictures. The 
results indicate that social information can influence subjective emotion experience to 
pleasant and unpleasant picture stimuli. Social information also modulated the late 
positive potential component of the event-related potential in response to unpleasant 
picture stimuli, providing support for a modulated encoding mechanism of social 
influence on emotion.
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Our interactions and relationships with others profoundly influence how we 
experience, express, and regulate our emotions (Manstead, 2001; Parkinson,
2011). Yet few studies of the emotion process have considered the influence of 
other people (Fischer & van Kleef, 2010; Manstead, 2005). The limited work on 
interpersonal emotion transfer (IET) has largely focused on two specific 
mechanisms, emotional contagion and social appraisal. Emotional contagion is a 
process by which emotions converge automatically when individuals are together 
through a direct mirroring or mimicking process (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 
1994). Social appraisal, on the other hand, occurs when another person’s 
emotions change how we evaluate the emotional value of a situation (Manstead, 
2005). Both processes demonstrate social influence on emotional experience, 
but research on the specific mechanisms through which emotional contagion 
occurs remains inconclusive and research on social appraisal is limited 
(Parkinson, 2011). Social influence research provides one promising avenue for 
better understanding the general mechanisms that underlie IET. The field of 
social influence provides an expansive body of literature to inform such research 
and its simple paradigms provide ideal conditions for investigating the 
neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie social influence on emotion.
One recent study found that emotion ratings from others strongly
influenced participants’ subjective ratings of the emotional effects of music
excerpts (Egermann, Kopiez, & Altenmuller, 2013). Furthermore, conformist
behavior was stronger in social information conditions than in conditions in which
1
2the ratings came from a nonsocial source (i.e. computer-produced ratings). 
Although this study provides initial support for the social conformity of emotion, 
the findings are limited to the context of music stimuli, and it remains unclear 
whether the internal affective processes that give rise to subjective experience 
were influenced. Continued investigation of social influence on emotion from the 
lens of social conformity will allow for a better understanding of the motives and 
mechanisms responsible for the influence of social factors on the emotion 
process. First, the separate literatures on IET and social influence will be 
reviewed.
1.1 Interpersonal Emotion Transfer
1.1.1 Emotional Contagion
Emotional contagion is theorized to be a two-stage process comprised of 
behavioral mimicry and facial and postural feedback (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & 
Rapson, 1994). In the first stage, people automatically mimic the facial and 
postural behaviors of others. Behavioral mimicry is thought to be an automatic 
mechanism for blending in with the environment that often occurs outside of 
conscious awareness (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Desire for affiliation increases 
behavioral mimicry (Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008) and the mimicking of 
negative emotions is specific to behaviors performed by in-group members 
(Bourgeois & Hess, 2008). Several studies have found that emotional mimicry 
relies on identifying the emotion being expressed, rather than simply copying its 
physical configuration (Halberstadt, Winkeilman, Niedenthal, & Dalle, 2009; 
Tamietto et al., 2010). Halberstadt and colleagues (2009) exposed participants to
2
3morphed facial expressions containing equal proportions of happy and angry 
features but paired with either the label “happy” or “angry.” Participants’ facial 
expressions during a second, non-matched viewing corresponded to the emotion 
label from the first viewing. The researchers concluded that participants 
responded to their interpretation of—rather than the content of—the facial 
expression. Tamietto and colleagues (2010) found that participants who were 
shown emotional posturing responded with facial expressions mimicking the 
emotion. Taken together, these studies suggest that emotional mimicry is a 
relatively automatic process for affiliating with others and blending into the 
environment. Furthermore, this process seems to depend upon identifying the 
emotion being expressed, rather than just responding to its physical 
configuration.
In the second stage of the emotional contagion process, individuals 
internalize the affective state related to the copied behavior through a feedback 
mechanism (Hatfield et al., 1994). Research on this second stage has produced 
mixed and inconclusive results (Parkinson, 2011). One of the most famous 
studies in support of this concept instructed participants to hold a pen with their 
mouths in such a way that their facial expression resembled a smile in one 
condition and a frown in the other (Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). Participants 
in the smile condition subsequently rated cartoons as funnier and more amusing, 
however the effect size was small and based on liberal statistical criteria. More 
recent studies have failed to replicate this finding (Andreasson & Dimberg, 2008; 
Soussignan, 2002).
3
4An alternative account for emotional contagion relies only on witnessing, 
rather than copying, others’ emotional expressions (Neumann & Strack, 2000). 
Neumann & Strack (2000) argue that perceiving others’ emotional expressions 
directly activates neural action codes that can trigger the associated emotion. For 
example, observing others’ expressions of disgust produces similar brain 
responses to personally experiencing disgust (Wicker et al., 2003). One potential 
explanation for this brain response is an associative learning mechanism through 
which we learn to associate certain emotional expressions with the emotions 
themselves (Parkinson, 2011).
Whether emotional contagion occurs in the presence or absence of 
behavioral mimicry, it is a direct response to another person’s emotional 
expression. Social appraisal, on the other hand, requires making a judgment 
about an emotional stimulus based upon the information gleaned from that social 
information.
1.1.2 Social Appraisal
Research on social appraisal has sought to improve upon the appraisal 
theory of emotion by considering the role of the social world in the construction of 
emotion (Manstead & Fischer, 2001). Manstead and Fischer (2001) suggest that 
people appraise the way others judge, evaluate, or behave in response to an 
emotional event and these appraisals influence the way the individual 
experiences and expresses emotions in response to that event. For example, 
watching a comedy depicting sexist humor in the presence of a friend who is 
sensitive to that humor might influence both your internal perception of the movie
4
5(e.g. how funny you find it) and how you express your emotions while viewing the 
film (e.g. how frequently you laugh).
Based on this account, social appraisal is often conceptualized as an 
inferential process in which people make judgments about the evaluative 
implications of others’ emotions (Hareli & Hess, 2010). However, social appraisal 
might occur in the absence of such an explicit inferential process. Indeed, one 
study involving 1-year-olds too young to engage in such a reasoning process 
found that toddlers were more likely to crawl toward a visual cliff if their mothers 
were smiling and less likely if their mothers were expressing fear (Sorce, Emde, 
Campos, & Klinnert, 1985). Although the toddlers made judgments about the 
emotional value (relative risk) of the visual cliff in response to their mothers’ 
emotional expressions, the judgment occurred outside of an explicit inferential 
process. More recently, Bayliss, Frischen, Fenske, and Tipper (2007) found that 
participants’ liking of household objects was significantly affected by emotional 
expressions directed at the objects. None of the participants were able to identify 
these expressions as affecting their liking of the objects, providing support for an 
automatic social appraisal process.
Research on both emotional contagion and social appraisal have provided 
support for the automatic nature of IET. However, the underlying mechanisms 
responsible for these processes remain unclear. One area of research that might 
provide valuable insight into potential IET mechanisms is the literature on social 
influence. Both emotional contagion and social appraisal seem to rely on 
identifying the emotion being expressed. Once the emotion is identified, it
5
6becomes social information that might exert its influence on emotion experience 
in the same way that social information leads to conformity in other contexts. The 
existing literature on social influence is reviewed in the following section.
1.2 Social Influence
1.2.1 Motives of Social Conformity
Many underlying motives lead to agreement or disagreement with others. 
Deutsch and Gerard (1955) were the first to posit a dual-motive scheme that 
distinguishes between informational influence, which arises from a desire to form 
accurate perceptions of reality, and normative influence, which arises from the 
desire to form and maintain relationships with others. The extant literature has 
upheld the distinction between informational and normative influence (Cialdini & 
Goldstein, 2004), but the two are interrelated and can be difficult to disentangle 
(David & Turner, 2001). More recently, many researchers have adopted a 
tripartite distinction (e.g. Chaiken, Pomerantz, & Giner-Sorolla, 1996; Cialdini & 
Trost, 1998; Wood, 1999), which identifies goals related to accuracy, goals 
related to affiliation, and goals related to maintaining a positive self-concept.
The goals outlined above are not mutually exclusive and conformity 
behaviors often serve all three goals (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Contributions 
from classic social psychological theory and the field of social cognitive 
neuroscience have sought to explain the mechanisms by which these goals lead 
to social influence. Traditionally, social influence researchers assumed 
informational and normative influences were related to unique mechanisms for 
generating changes in judgment as well as unique types of change. Specifically,
6
7informational influence was thought to instigate deeper processing of the 
stimulus and result in enduring, private changes in judgment. Normative 
influence, on the other hand, was believed to lead to less information analysis 
and to result in only public judgment changes (Wood, 2000). This traditional view 
has been challenged by the dual-mode processing model of persuasion (Petty & 
Wegener, 1998), which argues that motives for change are not preferentially 
related to specific change mechanisms or outcomes (Wood, 2000). Furthermore, 
recent advances in the literature have suggested that private, enduring changes 
in judgment are not necessarily the result of deeper processing, but may arise 
from modulated encoding of the object(s) being judged (Schnuerch & Gibbons, 
2014). The various mechanisms by which social influence might be exerted are 
reviewed in the following sections.
1.2.2 Social Reinforcement Learning and Cognitive Inconsistency
The main theories of social influence’s neural bases have arisen from a 
large body of work that has identified the detection of conflict as a central 
neurocognitive mechanism of social conformity (for a review see Schnuerch & 
Gibbons, 2014). One explanation for this conflict detection mechanism is that 
social conformity is based on social reinforcement learning (Klucharev, Hytgnen, 
Rijpkema, Smidts, & Fernandez, 2009). Conformist behavior is neurally 
reinforced through increased reward signaling when a judgment is made in line 
with the group and through negative error signaling when a judgment is made 
that conflicts with the group (Campbell-Meiklejohn, Bach, Roepstorff, Dolan, & 
Frith, 2010; Klucharev et al., 2009; Shestakova et al., 2013). Individuals adjust
7
8their behavior and act in conformist ways in order to reduce conflict and increase 
reward (Klucharev et al., 2009). These reinforcement signals likely rely on the 
posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC) for the detection of errors (Klucharev et 
al., 2009) and striatal activity for coding expected reward (Campbell-Meiklejohn 
et al., 2012).
Social reinforcement learning as proposed by Klucharev and colleagues 
(2009) relies on the detection of a conflict between individual and group 
judgment. More recently, Izuma and Adolphs (2013) proposed an alternative 
account of reinforcement learning that relies on cognitive inconsistency when a 
judgment deviates from a liked group, as well as when judgment is in line with a 
disliked group. Izuma and Adolphs found similar pMFC activation under both 
conditions. Rather than signaling a simple prediction error, the authors suggested 
this activation reflected a discrepancy between what would have been cognitively 
consistent and what actually happened (Izuma & Adolphs, 2013).
1.2.3 Modulated Neural Representation of Task-Relevant Stimuli
The mechanisms of social influence discussed previously rely on the 
notion that conformity arises to avoid deviance from group norms. Another 
explanation is that social information can actually influence individuals’ 
perception of the world. In his early observations of social conformity in a visual 
perception task, Asch (1951) suggested that social pressure might actually 
augment perception. More recently, social cognitive neuroscience has begun to 
explore Asch’s proposition, finding support for modulated encoding of stimuli in 
the presence of social information.
8
9Berns and colleagues (2004) first demonstrated that perception can be 
altered by social influence in an fMRI study of conformist behavior during a 
mental rotation task. Conformity was associated with functional changes in an 
occipital-parietal network, classically associated with perception. This functional 
change was especially salient when conformist judgments were made in line with 
other people rather than a computer. The authors concluded that social 
information influenced early information processing, rather than simply altering 
later decision-making processes.
Further support for social influence on early perceptual processes comes 
from an event-related potential (ERP) study of conformist behavior in a visual 
perception task (Trautmann-Lengsfield & Hermann, 2013). Decreased amplitude 
of the early visual P1 component and the later P3 component was observed 
when participants made a judgment in line with an incorrect group judgment. The 
early modulation of the ERP, occurring as early as 100 ms after stimulus onset, 
suggests an effect of social information on early unconscious visual perception 
and mental representation of task-relevant stimuli.
Social influence on basic encoding has also been demonstrated in the 
context of evaluative tasks that ask participants to make judgments about their 
preferences (Mason, Dyer, & Norton, 2009; Zaki, Schirmer, & Mitchell, 2011). 
Mason and colleagues (2011) found that activity in a brain region associated with 
the experience of reward—the caudate, a part of the striatum—differentiated 
socially tagged popular from unpopular symbols. Activity in the medial prefrontal 
cortex (mPFC), a brain region implicated in thinking about the attitudes and
9
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opinions of others, differentiated between symbols that were and were not 
socially tagged. The authors concluded that the mPFC and caudate likely work in 
concert to encode socially tagged stimuli. Indeed, previous studies have 
implicated the mPFC in coding for reward (Amodio & Frith, 2006; McClure, 
Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004), and the caudate might be particularly 
involved in representing reward that is socially derived (Sanfey, 2007; King- 
Casus et al., 2005). These findings suggest an interplay between normative and 
informational influence on the representation of reward and preference in the 
brain.
Brain regions associated with encoding subjective value have also been 
found to be susceptible to social influence (Zaki et al., 2011). When rating the 
attractiveness of faces for which peer judgments had already been presented, 
conformist judgments were accompanied with modulated engagement of the 
nucleus accumbens and orbitofrontal cortex. Zaki and colleagues (2011) 
concluded that exposure to group norms affected the neural representation of the 
stimuli’s subjective value.
Socially induced memory errors have also been found to arise from 
modulated neural representations of the memory (Edelson, Sharot, Dolan, & 
Dadai, 2011). Persistent memory errors were related to greater activity in regions 
associated with memory encoding and maintenance at the time of exposure to 
social influence (Edelson et al., 2011). The researchers observed heightened 
activity in the hippocampal complex that they believe reflected the encoding of 
new stable representations. This process was mediated by heightened amygdala
10
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activity, a region that plays a key role in modulating memory-related hippocampal 
activity as well as social and emotional processing. Functional connectivity 
analysis performed by Edelson and colleagues revealed heightened functional 
connectivity between the left amygdala and bilateral anterior hippocampus.
These findings suggest that external social information can change the way 
memories are represented in the brain, and this process likely involves 
intercedence from the amygdala.
Peripheral physiology has also provided important insight into social 
information’s potential to influence sensation and perception. Using galvanic skin 
response (GSR), Koban and Wager (under review) found that physiological 
response to thermal heat pain was influenced by others’ pain ratings. Although 
neuroimaging studies are necessary to elucidate the underlying mechanisms 
responsible for the modulated physiological pain response, these findings 
suggest that even basic sensory processes such as the experience of pain can 
be modulated by social information.
Taken together, these studies provide support for a theory of social 
influence that arises from early, unintentional modulation during the encoding 
process. If this is the case, conformist behavior does not only emerge to 
decrease the conflict that arises from disagreeing with the group or increase the 
reward signals associated with making a judgment that is in line with the group, 




One process by which basic encoding might be affected is through 
expectancies (Schnuerch & Gibbons, 2014; Koban & Wager, under review). 
Expectations have been shown to affect early, sensory stages of processing 
(Pessoa, Kastner, & Ungerleider, 2003; Shuler & Bear, 2006), and appear to 
mediate the effects of conditioning on pain reports (Kirsch, 2004). However, it is 
unclear whether early sensory processing, rather than later decision-making 
processes, was being influenced by expectancies in the case of pain reports. 
Koban and Wager (under review) addressed this question by measuring 
expectancies between the presentation of peer pain reports and the onset of pain 
stimuli. Expectancy effects fully mediated the relationship between social 
information and physiological pain response, providing support for expectancy as 
a process through which social information might influence basic encoding.
1.2.4 Summary of Neurocognitive Mechanisms of Social Influence
Social reinforcement learning and cognitive inconsistency arise from an 
error detection mechanism of social influence (Schnuerch & Gibbons, 2014). In 
social reinforcement learning, neural error signals indicate deviation from the 
group and neural reward signals indicate judgment that is in line with the group 
(Klucharev et al., 2009). Conformist behavior is learned through punishment and 
reward learning. A cognitive inconsistency account of this process suggests that 
error detection occurs not only when a judgment is made that deviates from the 
group, but also when a judgment is made that is in line with a disliked group 
(Izuma & Adolphs, 2013). Thus, this error detection is the result of cognitive 
inconsistency that arises when what happens deviates from what would be ideal.
12
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A modulated encoding mechanism of social influence, however, relies on the 
assumption that social information can actually change the way the object being 
judged is neurally represented (Berns et al., 2004; Edelson et al., 2011; Mason et 
al., 2009; Trautmann-Lengsfield & Hermann, 2013; Zaki et al., 2011). Support for 
a modulated encoding mechanism of social influence does not necessarily stand 
in competition with other theories of social influence, such as social- 
reinforcement learning and cognitive inconsistency (Schnuerch & Gibbons,
2014). Certainly, more intentional adjustments of judgments toward group norms 
can occur in the absence of modulated representations of what is being judged. 
The mechanisms underlying conformity might work in concert with one another, 
or might occur separately depending upon the nature of the social information, 
the object being judged, and the context of the judgment task.
1.3 The Current Study 
The aim of the current study is to elucidate the mechanisms underlying 
social influence on emotion experience. First, we seek to demonstrate the effects 
of social influence on self-reported emotion ratings in response to pleasant and 
unpleasant pictures. We hypothesize that self-reported emotion intensity ratings 
will be higher on trials with social information indicating high emotion intensity 
ratings from others than trials with social information indicating low emotion 
intensity ratings from others.
Second, we aim to test a modulated encoding mechanism of social 
influence on emotion. If the basic encoding of emotional stimuli is affected by the 
social information, we expect to see changes in the physiological response to
13
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emotional stimuli. Specifically, we expect to see an increase in the late positive 
potential (LPP) component of the ERP on trials with social information indicating 
high emotion intensity ratings. The LPP is a sensitive measure of the intensity of 
both negative and positive emotion experience (Hajcak & McNamura 2010). 
Modulated physiological response to the emotional stimuli would suggest an 
effect on early information processing, rather than later decision-making 
processes. Furthermore, we expect this process to be mediated by expectancy 
effects, based upon previous findings that expectancy mediates the relationship 




38 healthy volunteers were recruited from undergraduate psychology 
classes at William and Mary. Four participants did not complete data collection 
due to equipment issues or environmental distractors on the day of the study.
Five participants were excluded for insufficient artifact-free trials (<8 trials in any 
condition; Moran, Jendrusina, & Moser, 2013) for electroencephalogram (EEG) 
analysis. The final sample included 29 participants (20 females; M = 19.4 years, 
SD = .89 years). Participants were screened for psychiatric and neurologic 
conditions prior to participation in the study. All participants provided written 
informed consent and received partial course credit for their participation. The 




2.2 Materials and Procedures
2.2.1 Stimuli. 72 unpleasant and 72 pleasant pictures were taken from the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, &Cuthbert, 2008). 
Unpleasant pictures were selected based upon normative valence ratings below 
the 15th percentile, high normative arousal ratings, and for limited duplication of 
content. Within the negative stimulus set, 24 images were taken from below the 
5th 10th’ and 15th percentiles of normative valence ratings, respectively. The 24 
pictures with the highest arousal ratings in each interval, without duplicating 
content from another image in that interval, were included in the stimulus set. 
Pleasant pictures were selected based upon normative valence ratings above the 
85th percentile. Within the pleasant stimulus set, 24 pictures were selected from 
the 85th, 90th, and 95th percentiles using the same criteria described above for 
unpleasant stimuli. This procedure resulted in 72 unpleasant pictures with a 
mean valence rating of 2.45 (S.D. = .396) and mean arousal rating of 6.058 (S.D. 
= .553) and 72 pleasant images with a mean valence rating of 7.415 (S.D. =
.315) and a mean arousal rating of 5.672 (S.D. = .655).
The social information stimuli exactly resemble the stimuli used in Koban 
& Wager (under review). 144 different stimuli were generated (72 SocialLow and 
72 SocialHigh). Each social rating stimulus depicts 10 vertical lines (“others’ 
ratings”) on a horizontal line that closely resembles the visual analog scale used 
for participants’ ratings. The SocialLow stimuli were sampled from a normal 
distribution with M = 0.3 (S.D. = .015) and the SocialHigh stimuli were sampled 
from a normal distribution with M = 0.7 (S.D. = .015).
15
16
2.2.2 Procedure. Experiment protocol closely resembled the procedures used by 
Koban and Wager (under review). Participants were instructed that we are 
interested in their subjective experience of emotion while viewing pleasant and 
unpleasant pictures and how well they are able to predict their own emotional 
experience based on the reported experiences of others. Participants were 
instructed that the social information stimuli reflected emotion intensity ratings 
from 10 previous participants. Participants then performed six blocks of 24 trials 
each. See Figure 1 for a representation of the sequence of a trial. In each trial, a 
social information stimulus was presented first for 4500 ms. Participants were 
then asked to predict their upcoming emotions on a visual analog scale.
Following their prediction, a picture was presented for 3,000 ms. Participants 
were asked to rate their actual experienced emotions on the same visual analog 
scale immediately after picture presentation. Three of the blocks contained only 
pleasant pictures and three of the blocks contained only unpleasant pictures.
Trial and block order was counterbalanced across participants. The pairing of 
social information and picture stimuli was randomized, therefore social 
information was non-predictive of picture valence. For the unpleasant picture 
blocks, the visual analog scale was explained such that the low (left) side of the 
scale represented neutral/no emotion and the high (right) side of the scale 
represented completely negative emotion. For the pleasant picture blocks, the 
visual analog scale was explained such that the low (left) side of the scale 




2.2.3 Late Positive Potential. In addition to self-reported emotion intensity 
ratings, the LPP component of the ERP was measured. The LPP is an ERP 
component that reflects facilitated attention to emotional stimuli. It is a sustained 
positive deflection that is larger for emotional compared to neutral stimuli (Hajcak 
& Macnamara, 2010). Emotion regulatory attempts have also been found to 
reliably reduce the magnitude of the LPP and the degree of the LPP modulation 
is positively related to reductions in self-reported emotion experience (Hajcak & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2006).
2.2.4 EEG Recording. Continuous EEG recordings were taken from 62 scalp 
electrodes based on the 10-20 system (Jasper, 1958), as well as two reference 
electrodes placed on the left and right mastoids. Horizontal electrooculogram 
(EOG) was recorded from two facial electrodes placed approximately 1 cm to the 
left of the left eye and 1 cm to the right of the right eye. Impedances were kept 
below 15 kO.
2.2.5 Data reduction. All data was re-referenced to the average of the two 
mastoids and band-pass filtered with cutoffs of 0.01 and 30 Hz. EEG epochs 
were extracted, starting 200 ms prior to picture onset and lasting for a total 
duration of 1200 ms (baseline correction: -200 to 0 ms). Artifacts were identified 
using the following criteria: a voltage step of more than 50 pV between sample 
points and a voltage difference of 200.0 pV within a trial (Foti & Hajacak, 2008). 
Contaminated epochs were dropped from subsequent analyses. Previous studies 
have shown that the LPP is typically most pronounced at centro-parietal 
electrodes (Hajcak & MacNamara, 2010; Moser, Krompinger, Dietz, & Simons,
17
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2009). The LPP was evaluated as the mean amplitude at electrode CPz between 
300 and 1000 ms post-stimulus (see Hajcak & Nieuwenhuis, 2006).
2.3 Statistical Analyses
Self-reported emotion ratings were subjected to a 2 (social information: high vs. 
low) x 2 (picture valence: pleasant vs. unpleasant) x 3 (picture intensity: low, 
moderate, high) repeated measures ANOVA. Because no main effect of picture 
intensity was found, it was dropped from all subsequent analyses. Mean LPP 
amplitude was subjected to a 2 (social information: high v. low) x 2 (picture 
valence: pleasant v. unpleasant) repeated measures ANOVA. Mediation was 
tested using a method for testing mediation in within-subject designs developed 
by Judd, Kenny, & McClelland (2001). First, difference scores were calculated for 
both expectancy ratings and emotion intensity ratings by subtracting the 
SocialLow scores from the SocialHigh scores. The emotion rating difference score 
was then regressed onto the expectancy rating sum and difference scores.
3. Results
There were statistically significant main effects of Valence, F (1, 28) = 
12.943, p < .01,7]p = .316, and Social Information, F(1,28) = 52.278, p < .001, rfa 
= .651, on self-reported emotion intensity ratings. Figure 2 depicts mean self- 
reported emotion intensity ratings and indicates that subjective emotion 
experience was more intense for unpleasant pictures (M = 59.375, S.D. =
10.813) compared to pleasant pictures (M = 52.37, S.D. = 6.565), and for 
SocialHigh trials (M = 61.76, S.D. = 7.415) compared to SocialLow trials (M = 
49.984, S.D. = 9.408).
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Expectancy ratings were not a significant mediator of the relationship 
between social information and self-reported emotion intensity ratings. Using the 
within-subjects mediation method described above, we found both the 
expectancy sum and difference scores to be nonsignificant predictors of the 
emotion intensity ratings difference score, ps > .285.
Analysis of the EEG data revealed a statistically significant main effect of 
Valence, F (1,28) = 6.963, p < .05, rj% = .199, on the mean amplitude of the LPP. 
There was also a significant Valence x Social Information interaction, F (1,28) = 
7.167, p < .05, r)l = .204. Paired sample f-tests revealed a statistically significant 
difference between SocialHigh and SocialLowconditions for unpleasant pictures 
only, t (28) = 2.441, p = .021., and between pleasant and unpleasant pictures for 
the SocialHigh condition only, t (28) = -3.133, p = .004. There was no significant 
difference between SocialHigh and SodaJLowconditions for pleasant pictures, t 
(28) = -0.270, p = .789, or between pleasant and unpleasant pictures in the 
SocialLow condition, t (28) = -1.704, p = .099. False discovery rate for multiple 
comparisons was controlled for using Benjamini and Hoschberg’s (1995) method. 
Figure 3 depicts the LPP at electrode CPz for unpleasant pictures only, and 
depicts greater amplitude for SocialHigh trials compared to SocialLow trials. Figure 
4 depicts the LPP at electrode CPz for pleasant pictures only, and indicates no 
difference between SocialHigh and SocialLow conditions. Figure 5 depicts the 
LPP at electrode CPz in the SocialHigh condition only, and depicts greater 
amplitude for unpleasant pictures compared to pleasant pictures. Figure 6
19
20
depicts the LPP at electrode CPz in the SocialHigh condition only, and indicates 
no difference between pleasant and unpleasant pictures.
4. Discussion
The aims of the current study were 1) to test whether subjective emotion 
experience is influenced by others’ emotion ratings in a simple social influence 
paradigm, and 2) to test a modulated encoding mechanism of this influence. The 
results indicate that emotion ratings from others can influence subjective emotion 
experience in response to pleasant and unpleasant pictures and physiological 
response to unpleasant pictures. The observed differences in self-reported 
emotion ratings and electrophysiological response between SocialHigh and 
SocialLow conditions adds to the literature on IET in two key ways. First, these 
findings establish the feasibility of investigating IET in a simple social influence 
paradigm. Second, these findings suggest that others’ emotions serve as a form 
of informational influence on subjective emotion experience, leading to 
modulated encoding of emotional stimuli and conformity of emotion reports.
Most of the existing research on IET involves participants directly 
observing the emotion expressions of others (Parkinson, 2011). Some 
hypothesized mechanisms of IET (e.g., behavioral mimicry) even rely on 
witnessing these expressive behaviors (Hatfield et al., 1994). The current study 
demonstrates that subjective emotion experience can be influenced by 
information about others’ emotional responses without directly witnessing these 
responses. The observation of IET in a simple social influence paradigm allows 
for investigations of its underlying mechanisms from the perspective of a field
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that has already made strides in neurocognitive research (see Schnuerch and 
Gibbons, 2014). Since Asch’s famous line experiment in 1951, an extensive body 
of research has sought to explain social influences on human behavior. . 
Developments in social cognitive neuroscience have allowed for investigations 
into the neurocognitive mechanisms responsible for conformist behavior.
Because IET involves the conformity of emotional experience and expression to 
the emotions of others, it likely results from similar neurocognitive mechanisms 
as other forms of social conformity.
Research on social influence also offers insight into the potential motives 
behind IET. The most consistent distinction made in the social influence literature 
is between normative and informational influence. Normative influence arises 
from the desire to form and maintain relationships with others, whereas 
informational influence arises from the desire to form accurate perceptions of 
reality (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Because participants in the current study made 
their emotion ratings in private, the observed conformist behavior was likely not 
the result of a desire to form or maintain relationships with others. Instead, 
others’ emotion ratings likely served as sources of information that participants 
used to help them make accurate judgments about the emotional value of the 
pictures. Indeed, previous research on social comparison suggests that the 
emotional responses of others are used to evaluate the intensity, nature, or 
appropriateness of one’s emotional state (Schacter, 1959).
The second goal of the current study was to test a modulated encoding 
mechanism of social influence on emotion. If others’ emotion ratings influenced
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the encoding of the pictures’ emotional value, we expected to see increased LPP 
activity during picture viewing for SocialHigh trials compared to SocialLow trials. 
We found the hypothesized pattern of LPP activity for unpleasant pictures only, 
suggesting a modulated encoding mechanism of social influence on emotion in 
response to unpleasant picture stimuli. However, this pattern did not hold for 
pleasant picture stimuli.
Previous studies have demonstrated that attempts to decrease negative 
emotions can reliably reduce the magnitude of the LPP, and attempts to increase 
negative emotions can reliably increase the magnitude of the LPP (Hajcak & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2006; Moser, Most, & Simon, 2010). However, only attempts to 
decrease positive emotions have been shown to modulate the LPP (Krompinger, 
Moser, & Simons, 2008). Krompinger and colleagues found that attempts to 
increase positive emotion in response to pleasant picture stimuli were 
unsuccessful in modulating the magnitude of the LPP. In light of this, one 
explanation for the Valence x Social Information interaction observed in the 
current study is that the effect of social influence on emotion was driven by 
SocialHigh trials. Because an increase in subjective positive emotion in response 
to pleasant picture stimuli is not necessarily associated with an increased LPP, 
whereas an increase in subjective negative emotion in response to unpleasant 
picture stimuli is associated with an increased LPP, we would expect to see the 
observed pattern of results if others’ high emotion intensity ratings upregulated 
participants’ emotional responses. Further support for this explanation is the 
statistically significant difference in LPP magnitude between pleasant and
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unpleasant pictures in the SocialHigh condition only. This suggests that the 
SocialHigh stimuli enhanced the LPP in response to unpleasant pictures, driving 
the LPP difference between unpleasant and pleasant pictures. Future studies 
should include a control condition in which no social information is presented to 
test this explanation. If SocialHigh trials are indeed driving the results, there 
should be little or no difference between the SocialLow and control conditions.
An alternative explanation is that a modulated encoding mechanism of 
social influence on emotion is indeed selective for negative emotions. If this is the 
case, future studies should seek to replicate the current findings using alternative 
measures of modulated encoding. Because the LPP is not necessarily 
responsive to the upregulation of positive emotions in response to pleasant 
picture stimuli, fMRI could provide an alternative measure of whether social 
information is modulating brain activity in response to pleasant stimuli. In addition 
to more rigorous tests of a modulated encoding mechanism of social influence on 
positive emotions, future research should investigate other neurocognitive 
mechanisms that could explain the observed relationship between others’ 
emotion ratings and subjective emotion experience in response to pleasant 
picture stimuli. Our next step will be to test whether a social reinforcement 
learning mechanism can explain the observed relationship. Social reinforcement 
learning would affect the decision-making component of making an emotion 
rating, rather than the encoding of the emotional stimuli. This could explain the 




A secondary finding of the current study was a main effect of picture 
valence on both self-reported emotion intensity ratings and LPP amplitude. 
Unpleasant pictures elicited higher self-reported emotion intensity ratings and 
increased LPP amplitudes compared to pleasant pictures. Although the LPP is 
responsive to both negative and positive emotions, it is also influenced by 
arousal (Hajcak & Macnamara, 2010). The mean normative arousal rating of our 
unpleasant stimuli set (M = 6.034, S.D. = .582) was significantly higher than the 
mean normative arousal rating of our pleasant stimuli set (M = 5.6596, S.D. = 
.658), t (141) = 3.604, p < .001. Due to the normative valence and arousal ratings 
of the lAPs stimuli set, this is an expected artifact of our selection procedure. The 
difference in arousal between our pleasant and unpleasant pictures likely 
explains the observed differences in emotion ratings and LPP magnitude.
Although the findings from the current study extend our understanding of 
how social information influences emotion experience, several important 
limitations should be considered. First, two important dimensions of emotion, 
arousal and valence, were collapsed into one measure of “emotion intensity” to 
increase participants’ understanding of the task. Future studies should 
distinguish between these separate dimensions both in the social information 
presented to participants and in the subjective emotion ratings obtained from 
participants in order to better understand which dimension of emotion experience 
is affected. The nature of the social information in the current study was also 
limited to emotion ratings said to come from ten other participants. Future studies 
should test whether emotion experience can be altered by just one other
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person’s emotion rating, as research on IET typically involves participants’ 
emotional response to one other person. The relationship of the “others” should 
also be manipulated to investigate whether in-group membership is necessary for 
influence to occur. Finally, the sample used in the current study was limited to 
mostly White, mostly female undergraduate students. Future studies should seek 
to extend these findings to more diverse populations.
Taken together, the findings from the current study suggest that social 
influence on subjective emotion experience does not rely on witnessing others’ 
emotional responses, and its underlying mechanisms can be tested in a simple 
social influence paradigm. Thus, recent developments in neurocognitive research 
on social influence should inform future investigations of the neural mechanisms 
that underlie IET. The current study also provides support for a modulated 
encoding mechanism of social influence on emotion in response to unpleasant 
picture stimuli. Information about others’ emotional responses to unpleasant 
stimuli influenced the encoding of unpleasant pictures, resulting in subjective and 
physiological changes in emotion experience. This result was likely driven by an 
increase in negative emotions in response to emotion ratings from others 
indicating high emotion intensity.
Elucidating the mechanisms that underlie social influence on emotion has 
important implications for our understanding of the emotion generative process in 
a social context. Emotion experience and expression frequently occur in social 
settings and a growing body of literature has begun to direct attention to the need 
to consider influences of other people in research on emotion (Fischer & van
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Kleef, 2010; Manstead, 2005). In addition to influencing the emotion generative 
process, other people can impact emotion regulatory processes. Research on 
interpersonal emotion regulation has only recently been organized into a 
conceptual framework (see Zaki & Williams, 2013), and investigations of the 
mechanisms underlying specific interpersonal regulatory strategies are limited. 
Many forms of interpersonal emotion regulation, such as coregulation and 
sharing of affective states (Zaki & Williams, 2013) rely on or result in IET, making 
investigations into the neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie IET particularly 
useful in understanding the neural basis of interpersonal emotion regulation.
Although we discuss the benefits of investigating interpersonal emotion 
regulation and IET from the lens of social influence research, we do not suggest 
that these methods should replace the existing approaches of emotional 
contagion, social appraisal, and interpersonal emotion regulation researchers. 
Social influence paradigms offer unique opportunities to study the neurocognitive 
mechanisms that underlie general forms of IET, however distinct mechanisms 
might also underlie specific forms of IET such as emotional contagion and social 
appraisal.
5. Conclusion
The results of the current study suggest that subjective emotion 
experience can be influenced by others’ emotion ratings. Social information also 
modulated the magnitude of the LPP in response to unpleasant pictures, 
providing support for a modulated encoding mechanism of social influence on 
emotion. These findings suggest that directly observing others’ emotion
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expression is not necessary for IET to occur. This affords investigations of IET 
from the perspective of social influence research. The field of social influence 
provides an expansive literature to inform research on IET, and its simple 
paradigms are ideal for employing neurocognitive methods to elucidate the 
mechanisms that underlie IET.
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Figure 2. Mean self-reported emotion intensity ratings as a function of Valence 
and Social Information. Unpleasant pictures resulted in higher emotion intensity 
ratings than unpleasant pictures. SocialHigh trials resulted in higher emotion 
intensity ratings than SocialLow trials. Note that error bars are standard error.
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Figure 3. Mean late positive potential (LPP) amplitude measured at CPz as a 
function of social information for unpleasant pictures. The LPP is reliably 










Figure 4. Mean late positive potential (LPP) amplitude measured at CPz as a 
function of social information for pleasant pictures. There is no significant 
difference in LPP amplitude between SocialHigh and SocialLow conditions.
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Figure 5. Mean late positive potential (LPP) amplitude measured at CPz as a 
function of picture valence for the SocialHigh condition. The LPP is reliably 
enhanced in response to unpleasant pictures in the SocialHigh condition only.
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Figure 6. Mean late positive potential (LPP) amplitude measured at CPz as a 
function of picture valence for the SocialLow condition. There is no significant 
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